McGrath v Sturesteps; Sturesteps v HIH Overseas Holdings Ltd (in liquidation)  NSWCA 315
17 Whilst it is correct in my opinion that context and the surrounding circumstances known to both parties can be taken into account (see Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW  HCA 24; (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 350, 352) even in cases where there is an absence of apparent ambiguity ( Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165 at ; International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd  HCA 3; (2008) 234 CLR 151 at ; Park v Brothers  HCA 73; (2005) 80 ALJR 317 at ; Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd NSWCA 407; (2009) 76 NSWLR 603 at , , ) that does not permit the Court to depart from the ordinary meaning of the words used by the parties merely because it regards the result as inconvenient or unjust: Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd  HCA 36; (1973) 129 CLR 99 at 109.
18 This does not mean that there are not exceptional cases where, to use the words of Lord Hoffman, something has clearly gone wrong with the language so as to interpret it in accordance with the ordinary rules of syntax makes no commercial sense: see Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd, supra at -; Jireh International Pty Ltd v Western Exports Services Inc  NSWCA 137 at , . In such a case, in my opinion, a court is entitled to depart from the ordinary meaning to give effect to what objectively speaking the parties intended. This is not such a case. The parties have chosen to give their own definitions to “HIH” and “HIH group”, and the expressions have been used throughout the agreement in a manner which is commercially sensible and not such as to indicate a mistake in the language, whether considered on its own or in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances.