Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Senator Concetta Fierravanti-Wells  NSWCA 246
46Prima facie, a grant of power to a court (including the conferral of jurisdiction) should not be construed as subject to a limitation not appearing in the words of that grant. Rather it should be construed in accordance with ordinary principles and the words used given their full meaning unless there is something to indicate to the contrary. It is inherent in the conferral of such a power that it must be exercised judicially and in accordance with legal principle, thus warranting “the most liberal construction” of the power because such a requirement would exclude the possibility that the power might be exercised “arbitrarily or capriciously or to work oppression or abuse”: Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd  HCA 28; (1992) 174 CLR 178 (at 205) per Gaudron J; see also (at 190 – 192) per Mason CJ and Deane J; Patton v Buchanan Borehole Collieries Pty Ltd  HCA 23; (1993) 178 CLR 14 (at 17) per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ; (at 27 – 29) per McHugh J. In language reminiscent of Dixon J’s statement in Water Conservation & Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning , Gaudron J has said that a broad judicial discretion is properly confined by identification of the matters which are extraneous to the power and the exposition of those which are relevant to the power and the way in which they bear on its exercise: Patton v Buchanan Borehole Collieries Pty Ltd (at 23).
47Nothing in the decisions referred to in the previous paragraph means that a conferral of jurisdiction and power is “totally uncontrolled simply because the repository of the power [is] a court”: PMT Partners Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service  HCA 36; (1995) 184 CLR 301 (at 313) per Brennan CJ, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW)  HCA 19; (1999) 198 CLR 435 (at ) per Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ; Ascot Investments Pty Ltd v Harper  HCA 1; (1981) 148 CLR 337 (at 354) per Gibbs J (Stephen J agreeing). It is “[t]he words of the grant [which] chart the ultimate boundaries of the power”: Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd  HCA 22; (2002) 209 CLR 478 (at ) per Kirby and Callinan JJ. There may be occasions when it is appropriate to approach the question of the proper meaning of the grant of power on the basis that only the clearest express intention can displace fundamental legal principle or basic policy consideration: FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL  HCA 13; (1988) 165 CLR 268 (at 290) p er Gaudron J.